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which he had overlooked, as the judge himself had afterwards the candor to admit.
The remaining question is, whether any alteration has been effected in this matte
by the Evidence Act, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, which renders the parties to a cause
competent witnessess. No doubt there is considerable force in the observation of
Alderson, B., in the text, that a man. may now swear himself into an estate; at the
same time it may be as well to remember aiat before the statute he might by means
of perjured testimony have bought himself into it. Taking all the circumstances of
this case of Davics vs. Roper into consideration, it might be going too far to say that
the court in granting the second new trial overstepped their constitutional authority ;
but the princiileobviously involved in the language of the barons, that the stability
of -every verdict on matter of facts is to depend for the future on the approval of
the judge by whom the cause was tried, is rather an alarming one, and if followed
up by subsequent decisions, will prove an offshoot from the Evidence Act little contemplated by its framers.-JuRsST REPORTERL
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REPoRTs OF C.tss AnGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SURROGATE'S COURT OF TEE
COUNTy OF NEw YoRI.

By Alexander IV. Bradford, LL. D., Surrogate. New
York: John S. Voorhies, Law Bookseller and Publisher, 20 Nassau street, 1856.

This series of Reports was commenced in June, 1851. In this volume
the cases are brought down to February, 1856, and in the three volumes
of the series, we have all the decisions hitherto published, of the learned
Surrogate of New York. Taken together, they form' a body of what we
may call, for want of a better name, American Ecclesiastical Law, nowhere
else to be found in our libraries: and it is some satisfaction for the American lawyer to have volumes like these, to place by the side of Phillimore and
Haggard, and to know they are worthy of a place on the same shelf with
the decisions of Stowell and Nichol. It is especially satisfactory to see
this branch of law, hitherto so generally, so unaccountably neglected by
our reporters and authors, in hands every way capable of doing it justice,
and of developing into something like system our testamentary law.
With the exception of marriage and divorce, the only subjects of interest
to the profession here in the English Rep,)rts of this class, are those of
wills and administration. The peculiar cases growing out of church and
parish affairs, which fill a large space in these reports, are of little interest
or value here, where there is no union of church and state, to give them
authority even as precedents. On the other hand, there are many matters
of the first importance, which by statute are brought within the jurisdiction of our Probate and Surrogate Courts, but which in England belong
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exclusively to the Law and Equity Courts, such as the settlement of accounts,
matters of guardianship, payment of claims and legacies, and. sale of the
real estate of the deceased, for the payment of their debts.
On all these topics, as well as those of testamentary law in general, these
volumes are full of learned and lucid disquisition. The present volume
shows the same sustained vigor and ficility of execufion which marked the
others, while, as the series is extended, a greater range and variety of subjects are presented. The number of cases reported in the third volume is
greater than in either of the other volumes.
There are two distinct classes of cases in these reports. It must be
borne in mind that a Probate Judge is a Judge of fact as well as of law :
he is the Index, in the true Roman sense, as well as a Praetor. Witnesses
are examined orally before him: he sees and hears them : he decides the
question of fact presented, as well as the questions of law involved: hence,
besides the ordinary cases presenting purely legal questions, we have a class
of decisions, which are really judicial investigations, of intricate questions
of fact.
The cases of Laycroft vs. Simmons, Creely vs. Ostrander,and Oarroll
vs. Norton, belong to this class. They involve questions of testamentary
capacity and influence. In each case, the testator was over eighty years of
age, and in the last, the will Was hojJgraliic,a circumstance to which the
learned surrogate (citing D'Aguesscau) attaches weight. The wills were
all admitted to probate. These-opinions, as well as those in IEde vs. yde,
and Burger vs. Bill, involving the proof and presumption of marriage, are
purely judicial inquiries into questions of fact, and arc fine specimens of
the manner in which a thoroughly trained legal mind deals with a complicated and often contradictory mass of facts. These inquiries often, of course,
present important points of law incidentally. Thus in the curious case of
Jeanne Du Lux, the presumptions as to legitimacy and marriage under the
laws of the first French Republic, in relation to record and registration of
marriages and births, ara considered. This case does not seem to have yet
reached a final decision, upon the testimony directed to be taken by commission in France.
Of the purely legal decisions, the case of trrnam vs. Spencer, is one of
the most striking and elaborate. The deceased in that case, had signed
his will at the end, in the presence of two witnesses, attending, at his request, by one of whom it had been read over to him: and died in the act
of signing it in the margin, before be bad time to declare it his will or
request them formally to attest it, and before they could subscribe as wit-
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nesses. It was held, after an elaborate argument, by John C. Spencer, (the
last great effort, we believe, of that eminent lawyer) that although the
statute of New York does not require the witnesses to sign in the presence
of the testator, yet they must sign at the time of the execution, signing
being part of thefaclurm, and they must sign in accordance with his wish
and request: and although such wish and request might perhaps be inferred
from an actual signing with his knowledge of the fact, and the nature of
the paper signed, and from his invitation to them to attend as witnesses,
yet such signature cannot be supplied after death, however clear his intention. His request is revocatory until complied with. It. is revocable by
death. A paper which is not a will at the moment of death, cannot become
a will by anything done afterwards. Otherwise, heirs might be disseised
after descent. And a court can no more order the signature of the witnesses to be supplied, than it could order a man to go on and sign a will
he had concluded not to sign, or a witness to subscribe his name to a will
he had made up his mind not to attest, no matter what the stage of the
matter at which either party breaks off. The whole opinion is admirable
for logical force and for terseness of expressiQn. The case is a somewhat
special one, arising from the peculiar feature of the New York statute, dispensing with signature by the witnesses in the tcstator's presence.
On the other hand, while thus insisting upon substantial compliance
with all statutory formalities, the Surrogate holds, in Rielcn vs. flicks,
that a declaration to the witnesses before they sign, is sufficiently regular,
and that the parties arc not held to any strict order of succession in going
through the ceremonies of execution.
In THunt vs. Morn'tric, also, it is held that a declaration is necessary to
the due execution of a will, and a mere request to sign a paper without
proof that the witnesses knew it was a will, or that the testator knew what
it was, or that he knew whether they Knew, or not, is insufficient. The
main question in this case, however, is one hitherto undecided in the
English and American books, although it has been thoroughly discussed
by the continental jurists. Nor is this the only instance in which the
learned Surrogate has been forced to fall back upon the resources supplied
by the civil law. The volume bears throughout, marks of the careful
study and constant use of the invaluable writings of the continental jurists.
The question in this cse is the effect upon a will of personalty, executed
at the place of the testator's domicil, according to the law of that place, of
a change of domicil to a place, by the law of which it is informally executed
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After pointing out the confusion and inconsistency of the English decisions
and the clearness and uniformity of the continental authorities, the Surrogate comes to the conclusion, that a will of personal property, valid by
the lex loci acis, is valid everywhere, and is not rendered invalid, by a
change of domicil, and it is intimated that there need be no concurrence
of the lex loci actts with the lex domicilii. * In thus differing in opinion
with Judge Story, Surrogate Bradford is sustained, it must be confessed
by a most formidable array of continental authorities, even those cited by
the learned judge in support of his own position. Conflict of Laws, § 473.
In Wilson vs. Moran, the validity of a will of a client in favor of his
attorney, is considered.
In lustin vs. Proal,much learning is condensed in a small space on a
rather nice point in the calculation of degrees of kindred. The Surregate
holds that, under the New York statute of distributions, framed upon that
of Charles II., which was penned by a famous civilian, Sir Walter Walker,
and seems to have been taken in some degree from the 118th Novel of
Justinian, an uncle is in the same degree of propinquity as a nephew, and
equally entitled to a distributive share. The doubt arose from the fact
that by the English rule, a brother is preferred to a grandfather; and the
reason of this rule has been sought for in a doubtful (and in our opinion
erroneous) construction of the 118th Novel. The argument is, that if a
brother is preferred to a grandfather, a brother's son should exclude a
grandfather's son. But the English decisions do not admit this conclusion; and so early as Durant vs. Prestwood,4 Atkyns, 454, Lord Hardwicke held an aunt and a nephew to be equally entitled. The New York
statute expressly directs, in the absence of descendants, a distribution to
the next of kin in equal degree: thus doing away, it seems to us, the English
rule as to brother and grandparent. The Surrogate, however, we infer
from one of the head notes to this case, still recognizes that rule.
We have thus very inadequately noticed a few of the cases in this
volume. Surrogate Bradford is laying the profession and the public under
a double obligation; for, next to the merit of making a good decision, is
that of reporting it well. He is cultivating this new field of our jurisprudence with an ability equal to his sagacity in selecting it. The reputation of the New York bench and bar receives new lustre from his labors;
and in a recent English publication, the works of Story, Kent, Bradford,
and Wheaton, (three of them sons of New York,) are triumphantly pointed
to as proof of the great services rendered by American authors in one
important department of literature.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

COMXENTARIES ONTHE CRimNAL LAw.

Little, Brown & Co., 1856.

By JOEL PnENTISS BISHOP.

VoL I. Boston:

pp. 752.

The plan of this book is strictly that of a commentary, as distinguished
from a digest. The object being to present the principles of the criminal law, the great aim of Mr. Bishop has been to give principles and
reasons, while at the same time the citation of cases has not been neglected,
as the foot-notes most abundantly testify. While enunciating principles
of law, Mr. Bishop does not attempt to speculate to any extent upon what
the law should be, but simply confines himself to stating what it is. An
effort has been made to adapt this book to various classes of readers: the
practitioner, the student, the magistrate and the statesman. A book
professing to do so much cannot be fairly reviewed without a deliberate'
perusal, and we are unwilling to hazard an opinion which is to guide
oui readers, without more careful and extended study than we have yet
been able to devote to a production which has the merit of being prepared
by a well-known and much-appreciated legal writer. We may hereafter
return to a fuller consideration of Mr. Bishop's labors, after a more
attentive perusal.

A CoLLECTiA Or OVERRULED, DENIED, AND DOUlTED DEcIsIONS AND DICTA, O3TH
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH. By Si-oN GREENLFAF, LL.D., Professor at Law at
Harvard University. Fourth Edition, Revised and Enlarged. By JOHN TowNNew York: John S. Voorhies, Law Bookseller
SHSND, Counsellor at Law.
and Publisher, No. 20 Nassau street, 1856.

A notice of a work so well known as the "1Overruled Cases" seems to
be needless. The value of such collections is amply attested by the number
of editions called for and by the daily experience of every practising lawyer.
A ready means of ascertaining whether any given case has been doubted
or overruled, is most important, and no more convenient or satisfactory
work has yet been given to the Bar tban Mr. Townshend's edition of a
recognized book. The addition of fifteen hundred cases in itself shows
the absolute necessity of the compilation.

